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Abstract. This paper proves existence in a fairly general version
of the pre-marital investment game. The game has discontinuous
payos, so the method of Reny (1999) is used. The key assumptions
are that the matching process that occurs once investments have
been made is assortative and resolves ties eciently.
The pre-marital investment game is studied in Peters and Siow (2002)
and Peters (2004). These papers consider special separable environ-
ments. The current note provides an existence theorem for a much
more general version of the game. Preferences are continuous and
monotonic in partner's characteristic, but otherwise arbitrary. The
primary assumptions are on the matching process that occurs after in-
vestments have been observed. It is required to be assortative, and to
resolve ties in an ecient manner.
1. Fundamentals
For ease of discussion this paper simply adopts the worker-rm ver-
sion of the problem. The market consists of a nite number m of 'rms'
and n of 'workers'. We use the notation M and N to refer to the sets
of rms and workers respectively. It is assumed throughout that the
measure of the set N is larger than M. Each rm has a characteristic
x drawn from a closed connected interval X  R+. Each worker has
a characteristic y which is again contained in a closed connected inter-
val Y  R+. Firms and workers make investments k 2 K  R+ and
h 2 H  R+ in physical capital and human capital respectively, where
both K and H are assumed compact connected intervals.
Payos for rms and workers depend on their own type, on their own
investment, and on the investment level of their eventual partner. The
payo of a rm is given by v : K  H  X ! R, and that of a worker
by u : H K Y ! R. It is assumed that for each (x;h) the function
v (;h;x) is continuous, that v (k;;x) is strictly increasing in h. Make
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1the same assumptions for workers. A worker who is unmatched is
assumed to receive a payo u0 (h;y)  u(h;0;y).
The matching process is given exogenously. A matching is an em-
bedding  : M ! N. For convenience, write this embedding in its
characteristic function form, i.e., ij = 1 if rm i is mapped into index
j, and ij = 0 otherwise. Interpret ij = 1 to mean that rm i is
matched with worker j. The set of workers who are not assigned part-
ners by  is given by J 
 = fj 2 N : ij = 08i = 1;:::mg. Let  be the
set of matchings and 4() the set of probability distributions over the
set of matchings. A matching function is a map q : KMHN ! 4().
If q (k;h) is the probability that matching  is implemented given in-
vestments (k;h), then
P
 q (k;h)ij is the probability with which rm
i matches with worker j.
The matching function must satisfy two regularity conditions:
(1) (Assortative Matching) Let  be a matching such that q (k;h) >
0 for some array (k;h). For any pair of rms i and i0, suppose
that i0j0 > 0, ij > 0 and hj0 > hj. Then k0
i  ki. (Similarly
for workers).
(2) (Ties Resolved Eciently) Let  be any matching such that
q (k;h) > 0 for some array (k;h). Then there is no other





















The ecient matching condition says that ties are resolved in a way
that maximizes the sum of the surplus generated by matching.
















for worker j. An equilibrium for the pre-marital investment game is
a Nash equilibrium for the normal form game dened by payos (1.1)
and (1.2).
2The simultaneous pre-marital investment game typically won't have
pure strategy equilibria.1 The payo functions are discontinuous. For
example, if two rms have the same investment, then one of them can
strictly improve the expected quality of his or her partner by investing
just slightly more than some other rm. The discontinuities in the game
mean that standard existence theorems won't apply. Furthermore, the
game has an unusual structure. Firms, for example, compete against
other rms for partners. This is wholly standard, like a Bertrand pric-
ing game, or an auction. Unlike standard games, the gains to winning
the competition cannot be specied exogenously - they depend on the
investment decisions of workers.
Theorem 1.1. If the matching function satises the matching regular-
ity conditions, then the investment game described by (1.1) and (1.2)
has at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. To verify the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium, we take
the approach of Reny (Reny 1999) and show that the mixed exten-
sion of the investment game is reciprocally upper semi-continuous and
payo secure. Observe rst that the strategy spaces are assumed to
be compact connected intervals in R+. So the investment game is a
compact game with metric strategy spaces.
Let 4i be the compact set of regular countably additive probability
measures on (the Borel sets of) the set i = K;H. The mixed extension
of the rst stage game is the game in which the rms' and workers'
strategy spaces are given respectively by 4F and 4W.
Let  = f1;:::m;m+1;:::m+ng be the vector describing the
mixed strategies of the rms, then the workers. The arguments that
follow are completely symmetric for workers and rms, so focus on
rms' payos. For any single rm, write the mixed strategies of the
other rms and workers as  i. The payo of rm i in the mixed











~ Vi () 
Z
Vi (k; i;xi)di
A similar expression ~ Uj () can be written for each worker. (Note that
j's type yj is common knowledge in this game).
1See the example in (Peters and Siow 2002) which illustrates why.





















where the matching function depends on the entire vector of invest-
ments. We will show that this sum is upper-semi-continuous in invest-
ments.
Suppose upper semi-continuity fails at (h;k). Then there is an " > 0
and a sequence fh;kg ! (h;k) such that lim(h;k)!(h;k) S (h;k) >
S (h;k) + " . Since the number of rms and workers are both nite,
the number of ways to rank them is also nite. Hence we can choose
a sub-sequence fkn;hng such that all traders' ranks in the distribution
of investments remain unchanged along the sequence. In particular,
do this in such a way that any strict ranking is preserved everywhere
along the sequence. Then there is a single matching  that is ecient
(among the set of all assortative matchings) for each element (hn;kn)
of the sequence. By the denition of eciency, the sum of the payos





























































































































The second equality follows from the continuity of the functions v and
u. The inequality comes from the contrary hypothesis that the sum
is not upper semi-continuous. This contradicts the assumption that
the matching function eciently resolves ties. By (Reny 1999), the
upper-semi-continuity of the sum of the payos implies that the mixed
extension of the investment game is reciprocally upper semi-continuous.
The mixed extension of any game is payo secure if for every array








 ~ Vi ()   "
for all 0
 i in some weak neighborhood of  i. We show that the mixed
extension of the investment game is payo secure.
First, we formalize the obvious argument that a small increase in
investment won't reduce the payo in any xed match by much, but will
must always improve partner's quality. We then show that this small
increase in investment secures a payo against any array of strategies
(weakly) close to the original xed strategies. Fix strategies 
 i and


















Observe that the underlying utility function v (;;xi) is continuous,
thus uniformly continuous on compact sets. Then there is a  such
that v (k + ;h;xi) > v (k;h;xi)   "
2 for all h 2 H. Let R(k;k i) =
1 + #fj : kj < kg. Since R(k;k i) is the worst rank that i can have




























































Thus the investment k +  attains a payo that is within  of the
supremum of the payos against strategies 
 i.
We want to show that k +  attains a payo at least v    against
any array of strategies in some weak neighbourhood of 
 i. Let P (H)
and P (K) be the sets of probability measures on H and K respectively





be a sequence in P(H)n
P(K)m 1that converges to 
 i in the product topology. We want to















The result then follows from the fact that the expression on the left
hand side of (1.3) is a lower bound for the payo associated with the
investment k + .
The order statistics h() are all continuous functions, and v is contin-
uous. Since H is compact, v is a uniformly continuous function of each
worker's investment. Then for any worker j, if t




























by standard properties of weak convergence.
For any rm j dene R j (ki;k i) = 1 + #fi0 6= j : ki > ki0g. This
is the worst rank that i could have if j invests more than he does. Let
j be an arbitrary mixed strategy for rm j. Write the left hand side





























6where j (k) is the probability that rm j chooses an investment
strictly less than k. The function j describes the probability weight
assigned to an open set. By standard properties of weak convergence
(Billingsley 1999), liminf t
j (X)  














































































because of the fact that h(R(k;k ij)+1)  h(R(k;k ij)). Combining these

















for each j 6= i and every sequence t

















for each sequence t
 i that converges to 
 i in the product topology.






the investment k +  can be used to secure the payo v   . 
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